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THE TEST THAT ATE EVERYTHING2:  INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
There is little doubt that over the past thirty years, the most important doctrinal 
development in the jurisprudence of constitutional rights has been the formulation, and 
proliferation, of “tiers of scrutiny,” which are employed by the courts to reconcile 
individual liberties with societal needs.  These tiers were created by the Supreme Court in 
order to formalize the jurisprudence of rights, and to reconcile the general presumption of 
constitutionality and deference to legislative bodies with the inherently 
countermajoritarian nature of judicial review.  Originally, the Court created two tiers –
the highly deferential “rational basis review,” and the almost always “fatal in fact”3 strict 
scrutiny – to structure constitutional analysis.  These tests had their roots in the Court’s 
Due Process and Equal Protection jurisprudence, but by the 1980s  they provided the 
dominant mode of analysis throughout the Court’s rights jurisprudence.
Whatever the merits of two-tiered analysis in Due Process and Equal Protection 
analysis,4 in the area of free speech it was never adequate to explain the subtleties of the 
Court’s jurisprudence.  Rather, in addition to the strict scrutiny test (which was limited in 
the free speech arena to content-based regulations of speech) and the rarely-invoked 
rational basis test, beginning in the late 1960s the Court developed distinct free-speech 
tests to assess the constitutionality of regulations of symbolic conduct;5 restrictions on the 
time, place, and manner of speech in the public forum;6 regulations of commercial 
2 Cf. Jeffrey Steingarten, The Man Who Ate Everything (Knopf 1997). 
3
 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Forward:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
4
 And even here, problems soon arose, see infra, notes __ to __ and accompanying text.
5 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 
(1989); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
2speech;7 and a number of other areas of free speech law.8  For a short time, chaos seemed 
to reign.  Beginning in the early to mid 1980s, however, the Supreme Court, and even 
more so the lower courts, began to bring order to this tangle, ultimately combining these 
various “tests” into a single, unitary standard of review which has come to be called 
intermediate scrutiny (a development which paralleled, and drew upon, the emergence of 
an “intermediate scrutiny” tier of review in the Equal Protection arena, as the test for sex 
discrimination).
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny thus emerged as a product of the merging 
of several distinct, and relatively narrow branches of the Court’s jurisprudence.  Over the 
years, however, it has attained central importance in the overall structure of free speech 
law.  Indeed, so important and ubiquitous has intermediate scrutiny become that Justice 
Scalia has described it (pejoratively, of course) as “some sort of default standard,”9 and it 
has been the standard of review in literally dozens of significant Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeals cases over the past quarter century.  Despite this importance, however, 
scholarly analysis of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny has been curiously muted.  
Geoffrey Stone’s 1987 article on content-neutral restrictions10 remains the leading, and 
indeed the only significant comprehensive scholarly examination of this area of law, and 
while Stone’s article is both thorough and insightful, the law has of course evolved in the 
almost two decades since its publication.
7 See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
8
 These developments are discussed in more detail infra, at notes __ to __ and accompanying tesxt.
9 See Susan Dente Ross, Reconstructing First Amendment Doctrine:  The 1990s [R]Evolution of the Central 
Hudson and O’Brien Tests, 23 Hastings Comm/Ent L.J. 723, 727 (2001) (quoting Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 792 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part)).
10
 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L.Rev. 46 (1987).
3In this article I begin the task of plugging this hole in modern First Amendment 
scholarship.  In particular, the objective of this article is to explore how First Amendment 
intermediate scrutiny came to be born, and more importantly, how this form of analysis 
has been applied in practice in the federal appellate courts.  And an examination of the 
cases turns out to be extremely rewarding.  The story the cases tell, in short, is that 
whatever the theoretical merits and institutional convenience (for the Supreme Court, at 
least) of creating all-encompassing “tests,” the lower courts have struggled mightily to 
apply the intermediate scrutiny test with any degree of consistency or predictability to the 
vastly divergent range of factual circumstances in which intermediate scrutiny would 
seem to be the applicable standard of review.  In other words, the growth of an 
overarching intermediate scrutiny standard has created order only on the surface, masking 
underlying chaos; and even worse, it has sacrificed much-needed subtleties for doctrinal 
simplicity.  Furthermore, in applying intermediate scrutiny to reconcile governmental 
interests with free speech claims, the appellate courts have tended to systematically favor 
the government.  While the balance that the courts have drawn in individual cases is often 
perfectly defensible, and indeed may be an inevitable consequence of the form of analysis 
mandated by the intermediate scrutiny test, the aggregate consequence of this preference 
is to permit the suppression of substantial amounts of important, socially valuable speech.  
I conclude with some suggestions regarding where we might go from here to alleviate 
these problems.
TIERS IN FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
4The modern jurisprudence of tiers has its roots in the post-Lochner era, when the 
New Deal revolution forced the Supreme Court to reassess its existing methodologies.  It 
was at this time that the Court came to recognize that for reasons of institutional capacity 
and democratic legitimacy, under normal circumstances legislation should come to the 
courts with a strong presumption of constitutionality.  As such, even in the face of a claim 
of an individual-rights violation, action by the democratic branches of government should 
be struck down only if completely irrational.11  This presumption of constitutionality was 
strongest in the area of economic regulation (a natural reaction to the excesses of 
Lochner), but was never so limited.  And thus was born the modern “rational basis” test, 
under which legislation will be upheld so long as it is “rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.”12
While rational basis review provided an acceptable starting point for analysis in 
most cases, from the beginning members of the Court recognized that it could not apply 
in all cases unless the judiciary was to abdicate its responsibilities to check legislative 
overreaching.  This point was of course most famously made in footnote 4 of the seminal 
rational-basis review opinion in Carolene Products, where Justice Stone pointed out that 
judicial deference may not be appropriate “when legislation appears on its face to be 
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,” when it “restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation,” or when it is “directed at . . . discrete and insular minorities.”13  Restrictions 
11
 The seminal cases here are Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937); and United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
12 New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 
(1997); FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 
U.S. 450, 457 (1988).
13 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
5on freedom of speech would appear to fall squarely within Stone’s first category, and 
indeed he cites two First Amendment cases in support of it.14  Thus even at the height of 
the era of post-Lochner deference, in free speech cases the Court did not defer to 
legislative or executive actions, as evidenced by contemporary cases such Cantwell v. 
Connecticut15 and Bridges v. California.16  The more stringent review in these cases was 
not yet designated strict scrutiny (a label which did not yet exist in the Court’s 
jurisprudence17); instead, the Court employed a number of different doctrinal 
formulations, though the dominant one – invoked in Cantwell, Bridges, and a number of 
other contemporary cases – was the version of the Clear and Present Danger test 
developed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in their famous separate opinions.18
Regardless of names, however, the Court’s methodology here provided clear antecedents 
for modern heightened scrutiny in free speech cases.
The final step in the codification of tiered review in free speech cases was the 
adoption of the formal standards of review developed in the Equal Protection arena – that 
is, rational basis review and strict scrutiny – into the edifice of First Amendment law.  In 
particular, because rational basis review plays an extremely limited role in free speech 
14 Ibid (citing Stromberg v. California, 238 U.S. 359, 369-370 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938)).
15
 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
16
 314 U.S. 252 (1941).  Searching scrutiny in free speech cases went into temporarily eclipse in the early 
1950s during the McCarthy era, notably in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and Feiner v. New 
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), but soon reemerged and of course remains the rule today.
17
 The concept of strict scrutiny, as well as the term itself, originated in the Court’s Equal Protection 
jurisprudence.  The term is first used in the modern caselaw in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942), the leading case in the fundamental rights strain of Equal Protection law.  The principle that 
heightened scrutiny should be applied to all racial classifications can be traced to Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
18 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 672-673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-379 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
6cases,19 the key event was the formulation of the rule that all content-based restrictions on 
speech should be subject to strict scrutiny.  Oddly enough, this incorporation appears to 
have happened almost inadvertently.  As Justice Kennedy discusses in his concurring 
opinion in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd,20 the 
strict scrutiny test for content-based regulations entered free speech law via citations to 
Carey v. Brown,21 an Equal Protection case, albeit one involving speech.  And Carey
itself relied on the earlier decision in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,22 another 
Equal Protection case involving discrimination between speech based on content.  
Regardless of how it happened, however, by the late 1980s the adoption of the two basic 
Equal-Protection tiers of review into free speech law was complete, and seemingly 
universally accepted.23
THE ROOTS OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The above description of the gradual adoption of Equal Protection tiers, while a 
critical part of the story of modern First Amendment jurisprudence, is clearly incomplete.  
For one thing, the Court has long recognized, and defined, categories of speech which are  
completely (or almost completely24) unprotected by the First Amendment.25  But even 
with respect to protected speech, there have always been a number of strands of free 
19 Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(applying rational basis review to a regulation of nude dancing).
20
 502 U.S. 105, 124-128 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
21
 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
22
 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
23
 The tiers have also been incorporated into the law of substantive due process, see e.g., Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-729 (1997), and that of free exercise of religion, see, e.g., Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
24 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down content-based discrimination within 
category of unprotected “fighting words”).
25 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (“fighting words”); Roth v. United Sates, 
354 U.S. 476 (1957); (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement); New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography).
7speech cases in which neither the extreme deference of rational basis review nor the 
almost-automatic invalidation of heightened scrutiny has been applied.  It is these areas 
of caselaw that form the roots of modern intermediate scrutiny.
Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of the Public Forum
The first of the strands of cases that eventually emerged as intermediate scrutiny 
has its roots in the very beginning of the modern, post-Lochner era, in a series of free 
speech cases in which the Court declined to apply either the newly-minted form of 
deferential, rational-basis review, or the heightened scrutiny of the Holmes/Brandeis 
Clear and Present Danger test, presumably because neither seemed appropriate.  Instead, 
some sort of middle course seemed required, a form of analysis permitting the 
accommodation of social and private interests.  Thus in Schneider v. State26 the Court 
struck down ordinances banning the distribution of literature in streets and other public 
places, on the grounds that the State’s legitimate interest in preventing litter was 
insufficient to justify such a severe limitation on free speech.  Similarly, in Martin v. City 
of Struthers27 the Court held unconstitutional a flat ban on the door-to-door distribution 
of handbills.  In contrast, in Kovacs v. Cooper28 the Court (albeit by a 5 to 4 vote) upheld 
a ban on the use of sound trucks and loud speakers on public streets, on the grounds that 
the government’s legitimate concerns regarding safety and tranquility justified a limited 
restriction on speech.  Finally, in a related line of cases the Court considered, and 
generally struck down, ordinances requiring speakers to obtain licenses or permits before 
26308 U.S. 147 (1939).
27
 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
28
 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
8engaging in particular kinds of communicative activities.29  The commonality here is that 
in all of these cases, the Court was faced with laws which imposed substantial burdens on 
free speech, but which did not involve flat censorship (in today’s jargon, content-based 
regulations), and which did implicate significant, legitimate societal interests.  The 
methodological solution the Court adopted in these cases was the “weighing”30 or 
“balanc[ing]”31 of rights against community interests, to reach an appropriate 
compromise.
In recent years, in particular since the early 1980s, the Court has somewhat 
modified its approach to the problem posed in the above cases, which it now 
characterizes as the imposition of “content-neutral,” “time, place and manner” restrictions 
on speech on public property.  In particular, it has replaced the general balancing 
approach of the early period with a seemingly more formalized, 4-part test.32  Under this 
test, as formulated in the 1989 Ward decision, time, place, and manner regulations will 
survive constitutional scrutiny, provided that they are “justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”33  The Court has further clarified that the “narrowly 
tailored” aspect of its test requires only that the chosen regulatory means are not 
29 See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (striking down permit requirement for using sound 
amplification devices); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding requirement of a license 
before holding a parade or procession on a public street); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking 
down permit requirement for all distribution of literature).
30 Martin, 319 U.S. at 143.
31 Saia, 334 U.S. at 562.
32
 Though as I discuss below, in practice this test has amounted to little more than general balancing.  See 
infra at __.
33 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-726 (2000).
9“substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest,34 not that they 
constitute the least restrictive means to achieve its goals.  Finally, in addition to the above 
requirements, when a licensing scheme is at issue the Court has held that the “regulation 
[must] contain adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to 
effective judicial review.”35  Under this approach the Court has upheld such varied 
regulations as a ban on camping in a park, as applied to a proposed “tent city” to protest 
homelessness;36 a ban on targeted picketing of a residence;37 a requirement of using city-
provided sound equipment for concerts at a Bandshell in Central Park;38 a statute limiting 
protests near “health care facilities”;39 and a requirement that a permit be obtained before 
holding an event involving more than fifty people in a public park.40 On the other hand, it 
struck down a flat ban on demonstrations on the sidewalk outside the Supreme Court 
building,41 and at least a plurality applied the standard to strike down a flat ban on 
leafleting at an airport.42
Regulations of Symbolic Conduct
The other key source of the modern First Amendment intermediate scrutiny test is 
the Court’s jurisprudence regarding symbolic speech.  The leading case here is United 
States v. O’Brien,43 in which the Court faced a First Amendment challenge to a 
conviction under a statute forbidding the “forg[ing], alter[ing], knowingly destroy[ing], 
34 Ward, 491 U.S. at 800.
35 Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002).
36 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra.
37 Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
38 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra.
39 Hill v. Colorado, supra.
40 Thomas v. Chicago Park District, supra.
41 United States v. Grace, supra.
42 International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
43
 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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[or] knowingly mutilate[ing]” of one’s draft card, as applied to an individual who 
publicly burned his draft card in protest against the Vietnam War.  The question posed by 
the case was thus whether the First Amendment forbade the application of a general 
statute regulating behavior to symbolic conduct which conveyed a distinct, political 
message.  In assessing this claim, the Court created a new,  4-part constitutional test for 
regulations of expressive conduct:  such a regulation will be upheld  “if it is within the 
constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”44  Applying this test (albeit 
with some dubious reasoning), the Court upheld the conviction.
Since it was adopted in 1968 the O’Brien test has become the definitive doctrinal 
statement in this area.  The O’Brien test has since been applied by the Court to such 
diverse activities as the closing of an adult book store pursuant to a statute targeted at 
buildings used for prostitution,45 the application of public nudity statutes to bar nude 
dancing,46 and the application of the antitrust laws to a boycott by lawyers representing 
indigent criminal defendants, seeking higher governmental compensation.47  In each of 
those instances the Court rejected the First Amendment challenge to the regulation at 
issue, and in the course has clarified that despite its seemingly strict language, the 
O’Brien test is not an especially strict one.48
44 Id. at 377.
45 Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697 (1987).
46 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
47 FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U.S. 411, 428-436 (1990).
48 Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 871.
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Regulations of the Mass Media
As the above discussion demonstrates, by the late 1980s the Supreme Court had a 
fairly well-established, stable jurisprudence regarding time, place and manner restrictions 
and regulations of symbolic speech.  Soon thereafter, a subtle but extremely significant 
expansion of the ambit of these tests occurred, effectively creating a new body of 
jurisprudence.  In particular, the Court began applying its time, place and manner and 
symbolic speech tests to assess content-neutral regulations of the mass media which 
restricted speech which could not in any way be characterized as merely conduct, and 
which did not occur on public property.  By so doing, the Court appears to have begun a 
process of converting its two four-part tests, which as I will discuss had in any event 
begun to merge into a single test,49 into a general test for content-neutral regulations of 
speech, or at least of the mass media.
The beginnings of this expansion can be seen as early as the 1984 decision in 
Regan v. Time, Inc.,50 where a plurality applied the time, place and manner test to uphold 
a federal statute regulating the color and size of permissible reproductions of U.S. 
currency, as applied to a cover on Sports Illustrated magazine.  The critical case in this 
development, however, was the 1994 decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
FCC.51  In Turner, the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to Congress’s so-
called “must carry” rules, which required cable television operators to dedicate a 
proportion of their channel capacity to, and carry, free of charge, the signals of local 
broadcast television stations.  In assessing this claim, the Court first, over a vigorous 
dissent, concluded that the must carry rules were content-neutral, because they did not 
49 See infra at notes __ to __ and accompanying text.
50
 468, U.S. 641, 655-659 (1984).
51
 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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facially, and were not intended to, benefit or burden speech of a particular content.52
Having so concluded, the Court then announced, citing Ward and O’Brien but without 
much further analysis, that “the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the 
constitutionality of must-carry is the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-
neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech.”53  The Court then 
remanded the case to the lower court for application of this standard. 54
What is noteworthy is that the Court felt that the relatively deferential Ward and 
O’Brien tests should apply even though the must-carry rules clearly (despite the Court’s 
description of the rules as imposing an “incidental burden”) imposed a direct restriction 
on speech by the mass media, and even though the government had no special, 
proprietary justifications for its regulation.  As such, the Turner Court appears to have 
(albeit perhaps inadvertently) converted the time, place and manner and symbolic speech 
tests into a general test for media regulations, or perhaps for all speech regulations, so 
long as they do not target the content of speech.  As such, the decision represents a 
crucial step in the creation of an overarching intermediate scrutiny standard in First 
Amendment law.
Regulations of Commercial Speech
The discussion above elucidates the process by which an intermediate scrutiny 
standard was gradually evolving in the areas of “core” First Amendment concern, where 
the State was regulating fully protected speech, including notably political speech and 
52 Id. at 643-652.
53 Id. at 661-662.
54
 The lower court upheld the rules on remand, and three years later the Supreme Court affirmed that 
decision.  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
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speech of the mass media (i.e., “the press”).  At the same time, however, a similar legal 
evolution was occurring in other, perhaps less central but still highly significant areas of 
First Amendment law.  The most important of these developments occurred in the area of 
commercial speech regulations.
The term commercial speech, as used in First Amendment jurisprudence, refers 
purely to commercial advertising; the Court has defined it as speech which “does no more 
than propose a commercial transaction.”55  The category thus does not encompass speech 
merely because it is the subject of a commercial transaction, such as the sale of a 
newspaper or even the placement of a political advertisement – such speech is fully 
protected by the Constitution.  Until 1976 the Court understood commercial speech to be 
completely outside the ambit of the First Amendment, and therefore subject to 
unrestricted regulation.56  In 1976, however, the Court held that commercial speech, 
though admittedly of lower First Amendment value than other forms of speech, was 
nonetheless entitled to some level of protection.57  The exact level of protection was left 
unclear, though the Court did clarify that some regulations of commercial speech are 
surely permissible.    Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service 
Commission of New York,58 the Court finally adopted a four-part “test” for commercial 
speech regulations:  (1) first, the Court asks “whether the expression is protected by the 
First Amendment” – i.e., the speech “must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading.”  If this requirement is met, the challenged regulations will be upheld so long 
as (2) “the asserted governmental interest is substantial”; (3) “the regulation directly 
55 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002).
56 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1952).
57 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
58
 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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advances the governmental interest”; and (4) the governmental interest cannot “be served 
as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech.”  This test, despite the 
occasional criticism by various justices,59 remains the governing standard in this area.
The Central Hudson test has obvious parallels with the 4-part tests for time, place 
and manner regulations, and for regulations of symbolic speech.  There are however, 
some important differences.  Most notably, the Ward test for time, place and manner, as 
well as the O’Brien test, are limited to content-neutral regulations.  Commercial speech 
regulations, however, may be, and generally are, content-based; but because of the lower 
constitutional value of such speech, only intermediate scrutiny applies.  In addition, in 
application the test has performed quite differently from the content-neutral tests.  When 
originally announced, Central Hudson was seen as stepping back from Virginia 
Pharmacy, by creating a relatively lenient test for commercial speech regulations.60  And 
in fact, for the first decade of its existence the test was indeed applied relatively leniently 
-- indeed, in 1989 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, seemed to further weaken 
the test by clarifying that the fourth prong Central Hudson required only a “reasonable” 
fit, not the use of the least restrictive means available.61  Since around 1990, however, the 
Court has notably not been deferential to legislatures in this area, and has relied upon the 
Central Hudson test to strike down such diverse regulations as a federal ban on the 
advertising of compounded drugs,62 state restrictions on tobacco advertising,63 and a 
59 See, Thompson, supra, 535 U.S. at 367-368 (listing criticisms by Justices of Central Hudson test). 
60
 Indeed, Justice Blackmun, the author of Virginia Pharmacy, made precisely this point in his separate 
opinion in Central Hudson.  Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 573-576 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the 
judgment).
61 Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
62 Thompson, supra.
63 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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federal ban on labels stating the alcoholic content of beer.64  This aggressiveness is in 
stark contrast to the Court’s application of the Ward and O’Brien tests, which has been 
notably lacking in force, and has made commercial speech law one of the most active 
areas of modern First Amendment jurisprudence.
Speech of Government Employees
Yet another area of free speech law where in recent years the intermediate 
scrutiny standard of review has come to be applied is government restrictions on the 
speech of public employees.  To begin with, it should be noted that the issues raised in 
this area of law have obvious parallels to government regulations of speech on public 
property, since in both instances we are dealing with the government in the role of 
proprietor (or employer), rather than in the role of regulator.  There is, however, an 
important distinction here which must be born in mind – in cases involving public 
property, the intermediate scrutiny standard is limited to content-neutral regulations of 
speech, where the government’s regulatory interests are unrelated to the message being 
conveyed.  In the public employee cases, however, the government is punishing precisely 
because of the content of speech, in particular because of the potentially disruptive 
impact of the message conveyed by an employee.  Nonetheless, as we shall see, the 
governing legal standards for these two situations have turned out to be essentially 
identical.
The Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence on the speech of government 
employees has its roots in the 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education,65 in 
64 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
65
 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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which the Court recognized that speech of government employees on matters of public 
concern is entitled to constitutional protection.  At the same time, however, the Court also 
recognized that the government clearly has a stronger interest in restricting the speech of 
its employees than it has in restricting the speech of the general public.  As a 
consequence, the Court stated, it was necessary “to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”66  In short, the Court adopted a balancing 
test in this area, which has come to be known as “Pickering balancing.”
The basic approach to public employee speech adopted in Pickering remains the 
law today, essentially unchanged.  Later cases have clarified some of the details of the 
test, such as setting forth a framework to determine if an employee was indeed punished 
“because of” his or her speech,67 and clarifying the nature of the “matter of public 
concern” limitation in Pickering,68 but the essential balancing approach remains unaltered 
and Pickering continues to be cited for this proposition.69  This balancing approach has 
obvious resemblance to the Court’s approach to content-neutral speech regulations, and 
as we shall see, the lower courts have in recent years tended to subsume it into the 
general mass of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny.70
Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses
66 Id. at 568.
67 Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
68 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
69 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 125 S. Ct. 
521, 524-525 (2004).
70 See infra, nn. __ to __ and accompanying text.
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Regulations imposed by state and local governments on “adult” (i.e., sexually 
oriented) businesses such as adult book stores, adult movie theaters, and adult “clubs,” 
present some peculiar and distinct jurisprudential problems, which the Supreme Court has 
dealt with in varying ways over the years.  In recent years, however, it seems safe to say 
that the jurisprudence in this area has largely merged with the general intermediate 
scrutiny analysis.  As such, the regulation of sexually oriented businesses represents yet 
another strand of modern First Amendment intermediate scrutiny.
For obvious reasons, both moral and pragmatic, state and especially local 
governments often seek to impose special restrictions on the operation of sexually 
oriented businesses.  Such restrictions can take the form of zoning ordinances, 71
restrictions on multiple adult businesses in a single location,72 restrictions on completely 
nude dancing,73 and any number of other types of limitations or bans.74  The reason such 
restrictions pose difficult First Amendment issues is because sexual speech, so long as it 
falls short of obscenity (as it typically does in these cases), is in principle fully protected 
under the First Amendment, and yet the challenged ordinances appear to single out such 
speech for special, disfavored treatment on the basis of its content.  As such, under the 
Court’s traditional doctrine, such restrictions seemingly should be subject to strict 
scrutiny, and be presumptively unconstitutional.  Nonetheless, in a series of cases 
beginning with Young v. American Mini-Theatres in 1976, 75 the Court has upheld 
restrictions on sexually oriented businesses without applying strict scrutiny.  The key 
71 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
475 U.S. 41 (1986).
72 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
73 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 
(2000).
74 See infra at nn. __ - __ and accompanying notes (discussing appellate cases on subject).
75
 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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doctrinal innovation adopted by the Court was its conclusion in the 1986 City of Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres decision76 that so long as a challenged ordinance is directed at the 
“secondary effects” of adult businesses (i.e., the crime and blight that they often are 
associated with) rather than seeking to suppress the speech itself, it should be treated as 
content-neutral, and so subject only to the test for time, place and manner regulations.  
The secondary effects doctrine is an extremely odd one, as it seems clearly inconsistent 
with the Court’s approach to content neutrality elsewhere in its First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and its application has been limited strictly to the context of sexually 
oriented speech.77  The secondary effects doctrine has recently been criticized by what 
seems to be a majority of the Court, and so its continuing vitality might be in doubt.78
Nonetheless, the basic holding of Renton that regulations of adult businesses short of 
outright bans should be subjected to intermediate and not strict scrutiny, continues to be 
followed.79
Charitable Solicitation
In three cases in the 1980s, the Supreme Court considered, and struck down, 
various attempts by states to regulate professional, charitable solicitation.80  In those 
cases, the Court made clear that charitable solicitation was not equivalent to commercial 
speech, and so deserved strong First Amendment protection.  At the same time, however, 
76
 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
77 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 573-574 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
78 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 444-447 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Id. at 455-460 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 440 (plurality opinion); id. at 447 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
80 Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Sec. of State of 
Maryland v. Joseph Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 
(1988).
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the Court seemed to suggest that because of its nature (and intertwining with conduct 
elements), charitable solicitation should be subject to “reasonable regulation.”81  The 
Court then proceeded in these cases to apply an indeterminate form of balancing/tailoring 
analysis to strike down the regulations.82
The precise doctrinal test applicable to regulations of charitable solicitations  thus 
remains somewhat unclear.  The Riley Court suggested that at least with respect to 
content-based regulations of such solicitation, strict scrutiny should apply;83 though this 
suggestion is in itself deceptive, because regulations of charitable solicitations by 
definition target speech based on its content (a request for money on behalf of a charity), 
and as such seem necessarily to be content-based under the general test.  Nonetheless, so 
long as the regulations do not restrict the speech a charitable solicitor utters, the 
applicable test appears to be something short of strict scrutiny.84  In a recent Fourth 
Circuit decision authored by Judge Wilkinson, the court recognized that there has been 
some confusion on this subject in the lower courts, but also recognized that many courts 
are treating the Village of Schaumburg test as converging with the general intermediate 
scrutiny analysis.85  Moreover, while the Fourth Circuit itself did not resolve the 
ambiguity about whether the test is properly described as “strict” or “intermediate,” it 
then proceeded to uphold two quite broad regulations (issued by the Federal Trade 
81 Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
82 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 787-789 (describing test applied in cases).
83
 487 U.S. at 795-801.
84
 In Riley, a disclosure requirement was treated as a direct regulation of content, and so subject to more 
stringent scrutiny than other regulations.  See ibid.
85 National Federation of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Nat’l Fed. of the 
Blind of Arkansas v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001) (equating Village of Schaumburg standard to 
the time, place and manner test); see also Fraternal Order of Police, North Dakota State Lodge et al. v. 
Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2005) (same, and describing test as “intermediate scrutiny”); Am. 
Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (describing standard as “an intermediate 
level of scrutiny”)).
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Commission) of professional telemarketing on behalf of charitable foundations – a result 
which would be most unlikely under a true, strict scrutiny standard.  As such, it would 
appear that the test for regulations of charitable solicitation has indeed largely merged 
into the general, intermediate scrutiny test.86
Regulation of Political Contributions
Finally, another area of First Amendment jurisprudence where the applicable 
standard of review might – and here it is important to emphasize the word might – be 
evolving towards intermediate scrutiny is analysis of the constitutionality of statutory 
restrictions on political contributions.  The Supreme Court’s leading decision in this area 
was the 1976 Buckley v. Valeo opinion.87  In Buckley the Court heard constitutional 
challenges to restrictions placed by the Federal Election Campaign Act on both political 
expenditures by candidates, and political contributions to candidates by members of the 
public.  Critically, the Buckley Court distinguished between expenditures and 
contributions, imposing a substantially higher standard of review on expenditure 
limitations than on contribution limitations, the result of which was the invalidation of 
expenditure limits, but the upholding of contribution limits.  In more recent cases the 
Court has reaffirmed this distinction, and relied upon it to sustain numerous regulations 
and restrictions of political contributions.88  If the applicable test for expenditure limits is 
strict scrutiny, as it appears to be, then the test for political contributions, which is clearly 
86 Cf. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. Of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164 (2002) (declining to 
resolve question of what standard of review applied to ordinance requiring charitable solicitors to obtain 
permit).
87
 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
88 See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-390 (2000); McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 134-138 & n.40 (2003).
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more lenient, and deferential, than the latter, would appear to resemble intermediate 
scrutiny.  And indeed, at least one lower court has explicitly applied intermediate scrutiny 
to uphold a restriction on political contributions (there, a Michigan law requiring annual 
consent if corporations or labor unions sought to use automatic payroll contributions to 
obtain political contributions from members or employees).89
Having said this, it must be acknowledged that there are grave doubts about 
whether the Supreme Court itself understands the test for political contributions to be 
intermediate scrutiny.  In Buckley the Court explicitly rejected application of either the 
O’Brien or time, place and manner tests to the statute before it (including the contribution 
limits),90 and that rejection was reaffirmed in the 2000 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC case.91  Indeed, those cases suggest that the applicable standard of 
review is strict scrutiny.  In fact, however, it is obvious that the level of scrutiny the Court 
has accorded to contribution limits from 1976 through to the recent McConnell v. FEC
case is simply not as stringent as traditional strict scrutiny.  It has permitted the 
government, in defending those restrictions to invoke such vague governmental interests 
as preventing the appearance of corruption,92 and has explicitly deferred to congressional 
judgments regarding the proper balance to be drawn in this area.93  This approach 
certainly seems more reminiscent of intermediate than strict scrutiny, no matter how the 
Court might title the test it is using, suggesting that in practice, if not in name, the 
89 Michigan State v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1251-1252 (6th Cir. 1997).
90 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-18.
91
 528 U.S. at 386.
92 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136.
93 Id. at 137.
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standard of review of restrictions on political contributions is evolving towards 
intermediate scrutiny.94
MERGER AND SYNTHESIS
Merger in the Supreme Court
The various areas of First Amendment doctrine described above have very 
different origins and very different pedigrees.  Some, such as the public forum doctrine, 
have their roots in cases from the 1930s, or even earlier, while others, such as the 
commercial speech doctrine and rules regarding adult businesses, are entirely products of 
the last thirty years.  Furthermore, the evolutions of these different strands of law reflect 
quite distinct policies and concerns.  The public forum doctrine, for example, reflects the
Court’s reconciliation of free speech rights with the government’s legitimate, managerial 
concerns, and the symbolic speech cases reflect a similar reconciliation of constitutional 
values with the government’s obviously legitimate power to protect society from harmful 
conduct.  Other areas of law, however, reflect entirely distinct policies.  The Court’s 
reasons for protecting commercial speech seem to sound more in substantive due 
process/economic liberty principles than in free speech policy,95 and its reasons for 
tolerating regulation of such speech are also distinct.  Similarly, the cases regarding 
regulation of the mass media (and, for that matter, the cases regarding political 
contributions) reflect judgments regarding the power of Congress to advance diversity of 
speech even if the consequence is to burden the speech of some, which has little or 
nothing to do with the explicit balancing entailed in the time, place, and manner and 
94 Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying a seemingly more deferential form of “strict 
scrutiny” to a race-based admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School).
95 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762-765.
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symbolic speech cases.  The variation in these policies and interests, at first, lead to Court 
to treat each of these bodies of law as distinct, leading to distinct formulations of the 
relevant doctrinal “tests,” insofar as any such tests were formulated.
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has tended to ignore, if not entirely 
abandon, these distinctions.  Instead, the Supreme Court has come to emphasize the fact 
that despite somewhat differing formulations, many of the Court’s new “tests” share 
some basic, common characteristics: under these tests, laws will be upheld so long as 
they serve some sort of a significant/substantial/important governmental interest and are 
reasonably well-tailored to that purpose (i.e., there were not unreasonably overbroad).   
First, beginning in the mid- 1980s the Court began to acknowledge that there was little, if 
any, difference between the time, place and manner test, and the symbolic speech test of 
O’Brien, applying them interchangeably.96  About the same time, the Court through the 
“secondary effects” fiction extended this test to regulations of adult businesses.  Then, in 
the late 1980s the Court went further to acknowledge that its commercial speech test was 
“substantially similar” to its time, place, and manner and symbolic speech tests;97 and 
indeed went so far as to rely explicitly on time, place, and manner cases in weakening the 
“narrow tailoring” prong of the commercial speech doctrine to require only that the fit 
between the challenged regulation and the government’s aims be “reasonable.”98  Next, in 
the 1994 Turner decision the Court extended the time, place, and manner test to content-
neutral regulations of the mass media even when the relevant speech was not on 
96 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 & n.8 (1984); Ward, 491 U.S. at 
798; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.  For a description of the evolution, and merging, of the Ward and O’Brien
tests, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media:  The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, and the 
Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 141, 166-172 (1994).
97 Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989), and cases cited therein.
98 Id. at 480.
24
government property, and so did not intrude upon any proprietary or managerial interests 
of the government.  As such, by the mid-1990s, the Court had acknowledged the 
similarities, and in effect merger, of what I have identified above as most of important 
strands of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny.  Admittedly, the Supreme Court does 
not consistently describe the various strands of doctrine described above as constituting a 
unified form of intermediate scrutiny analysis, nor indeed do the Justices appear to have 
fully accepted the complete merger of the Court’s various tests;99 but the process of 
merger appears to be well on its way.
Synthesis in the Courts of Appeals
If the merger of the various strands of doctrine described above into a unitary, 
overarching standard of review has not yet been fully accomplished, or acknowledged, by 
the Supreme Court, that process has in fact occurred in the Courts of Appeals.  As the 
cases described herein indicate, there can be no doubt that the Courts of Appeals seem to 
uniformly accept the existence of a single, overarching standard of First Amendment 
scrutiny called “intermediate scrutiny,” which has emerged as a synthesis of the various 
distinct bodies Supreme Court doctrine discussed in the previous section.  Moreover, the 
Courts of Appeals appear to have taken the next step, beyond the Court’s current 
jurisprudence, of treating intermediate scrutiny as a, to use Justice Scalia’s words, 
99 But cf. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 579-580 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing O’Brien as “an 
intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny”); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. Of N.Y. v. Village of 
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 175-76 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (advocating “intermediate scrutiny” for 
ordinance regulating charitable solicitation); Turner Broadcastings Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189, 213 
(1997) (discussing application of “intermediate scrutiny,” and citing both Ward and O’Brien);  see 
generally City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (opinions debating applicability of 
intermediate scrutiny to regulation of adult businesses).
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“default standard,”100 applicable to any governmental regulation of speech which, for 
whatever reason, does not trigger strict scrutiny.  As such, intermediate scrutiny has 
become a doctrine of surpassing importance in First Amendment law as it operates in 
action, in day-to-day constitutional litigation.
The use of the phrase “intermediate scrutiny” in First Amendment cases in the 
Courts of Appeals dates back to two cases from the mid-1980s referencing the 
commercial speech standard.101  The true explosion of the use of intermediate First 
Amendment scrutiny by the Court of Appeals began, however, in the mid-1990s, as those 
courts began to take account of the Supreme Court’s statements in cases such as Clark, 
Ward, SUNY v. Fox, and Turner, that there were no significant differences between the 
standards of review applicable in symbolic conduct, time, place, and manner, commercial 
speech, and media regulation cases.  Thus in 1994 alone, the Courts of Appeals issued at 
least six important free speech decisions explicitly invoking the intermediate scrutiny 
standard, on topics ranging from economically significant regulations of the mass 
media,102 to regulations of adult businesses,103 to regulations of highway signs.104  And as 
the next Section indicates, that rate has continued apace since that time, indeed 
accelerating substantially in the current decade.  Furthermore, as those materials also 
indicate, intermediate scrutiny cases in recent years continue to demonstrate a 
tremendous range and variety, covering everything from extremely broad, national 
regulations of the structure of the mass media, to run of the mill local zoning disputes, to 
100 See n.9, supra, and accompanying text.
101 Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Com., 701 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1983); Glover v. 
Cole, 762 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir. 1985).
102 See US West v. U.S., 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. U.S., 42 
F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
103 See American Library Association v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994); MD II Entertainment v. City of 
Dallas, 28 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 1994).
104 Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1061-1066 (4th Cir. 1994).
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cases touching upon the “War on Terror.”  As such, the cases clearly establish that in the 
collective vision of the Courts of Appeals, there certainly exists a unitary “intermediate 
scrutiny” test in First Amendment jurisprudence, and further that that test has a very 
broad range.
One also finds in the cases repeated recognition by the courts that the various 
strands of “intermediate scrutiny” doctrine are in fact interchangeable, and so need not be 
distinguished.  Thus in Hodkins v. Peterson, in evaluating a youth curfew ordinance, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that the symbolic speech and time, place, and manner standards are 
equivalent, and described them jointly as “tests that apply an intermediate level of 
scrutiny to content neutral government regulations affecting speech.”105  The Seventh 
Circuit has elsewhere acknowledged the equivalence of the Renton standard for adult 
businesses and the O’Brien symbolic speech test;106 and Tenth Circuit, acknowledging 
the same equivalence, has then applied the test to a regulation of charitable solicitation.107
Finally, at least one court has held that a generally applicable “intermediate scrutiny” 
standard, derivable from such diverse sources as the Pickering test for speech of 
government employees, as well as cases dealing with political patronage and political 
contributions, should govern challenges to the associational and speech rights of 
government employees.108  Indeed, as the cases discussed in the next Section 
demonstrate, there is now a widespread willingness among the Courts of Appeals to 
105 Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1057 (7th Cir. 2004).
106 G.M. Enterprises v. Town of St. Joseph, 350 F.3d 631, 638 (7th Cir. 2003).
107 American Target Advertising v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000).
108 International Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 3808 v. City of Kansas City, 220 F.3d 969, 973-974 (8th
Cir. 2000); see also Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1037 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing Pickering
balancing “as a form of intermediate scrutiny”).
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discuss and apply a generic “intermediate scrutiny” standard, often without any effort to 
disentangle its forebears.109
The trend towards integration has proceeded so far in the Courts of Appeals as to 
have important, substantive consequences.  Two developments are especially worth 
noting.  First, there are numerous instances in which, as a consequence of the merging of 
the various strands of intermediate scrutiny, the “secondary effects” analysis of City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres has been extended beyond the arena of regulations of 
sexually oriented businesses to which the Supreme Court has strictly confined it,110 into 
other areas of First Amendment analysis -- with predictably troubling results.  Thus in 
Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Assn.,111 the Sixth Circuit relied upon 
secondary effects analysis to hold that a regulation forbidding schools from using “undue 
influence” in recruiting student athletes, including a flat ban on any contact between 
coaching staff and prospective students, was content-neutral and so subject only to 
intermediate scrutiny.  Similarly, in two separate cases the Sixth and D.C. Circuits upheld 
a federal statute imposing extensive record-keeping requirements regarding the identity 
and age of persons depicted on all person producing visual depictions of sexually explicit 
conduct (regardless of the age of the participating individuals), on the theory that this 
statute targeted only the “secondary effects” of such materials – in particular, the 
production of child pornography – and not the content of the speech itself.112  The 
analysis was thus applied to a statute which was obviously facially content-based, in that 
109 Cf. Gun Owners’ Action League v. Swift, 284 F.3d 198, 210-212 (1st Cir. 2002) (in which the court 
upholds a law banning the use of human-shaped targets in target practice, describing the statute as a 
“content-neutral regulation of expressive conduct,” thereby conflating the O’Brien and time, place, manner 
tests).
110 See nn.75-76, supra, and accompanying text.
111
 262 F.3d 543, 551-554 (6th Cir. 2001).
112 Connection Distribution Company v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 290-291 (6th Cir. 1998); American Library 
Association v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir.  1994).
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it imposed a burden on speech triggered precisely by its content, and where the evil to be 
avoided was in no way a product of the plaintiff’s own speech (as the secondary effects 
doctrine would appear to require), but was rather that of other speakers (i.e., actual child 
pornographers, which the plaintiffs were not).  The above cases thus illustrate one 
systematic way in which the coalescence of intermediate scrutiny doctrine has tilted free 
speech doctrine in favor of the government.113
Even more important than the expansion of the “secondary effects” doctrine, 
however, has been the expansion by appellate courts of intermediate scrutiny generally to 
govern any challenge to any statute regarded by the court as content-neutral, regardless of 
whether any of the triggers to lowered scrutiny identified by the Supreme Court are 
present.  In other words, the Courts of Appeals have extended the intermediate scrutiny 
test to all content-neutral regulations of speech, even if the speech does not occur on 
public property (and so implicate the government’s proprietary interests), does not 
involve symbolic conduct (and so raise the usual concerns about socially harmful 
conduct), does not involve structural regulation of the media (with its own special 
problems), and does not involve lower-value speech such as commercial speech or 
sexually explicit speech.  Put differently, these cases apply intermediate scrutiny to 
government regulations of private speech, on private property, solely on the grounds that 
the regulations are not content-based.
Examples of this expansion of intermediate scrutiny abound.  Consider for 
example Casey v. City of Newport, involving a challenge to a licensing restriction 
113 Cf. McGure v Kelly, 260 F.3d 36, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing City of Renton in the course of finding 
content-neutral, and upholding, statute restricting speech near abortion clinics).
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banning the use of amplification, as well as all singing, in a nightclub.114  The court 
concluded that intermediate scrutiny (which it characterized as a form of balancing)115
applied because the rules were content-neutral, though it did ultimately strike down the 
rule on tailoring grounds.  Or consider Universal Cities Studios, Inc. v. Corly, where the 
Court applied intermediate scrutiny to, and upheld, a provision of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act which prohibited posting or linking to software which permitted 
decryption of copyrighted materials, because the law was content-neutral, in that it 
targeted only the functional aspects of prohibited code.  Other examples include the 
Brentwood Academy case discussed above, where the court upheld under intermediate 
scrutiny a rule regulating recruitment of high school athletes, and National Amusements 
v. Town of Dedham,116 where the court applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold a law 
barring movie theaters from showing movies between one and 6 a.m.
A particularly interesting instance of this development is Rappa v. New Castle 
County, 117 in which the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to largely uphold a 
set of state and local laws banning advertising along highways, but with many exceptions 
built into the ban (including exceptions for direction and traffic signs, for sale signs, and 
numerous other commonly used highway signs), as applied to signs supporting a political 
candidacy.  Crucially, the ban applied to all signs close to highways, including those 
located on private property, and yet the court’s analysis in no way considered this fact 
relevant.  In each of these cases, the court was faced with a regulation of fully protected 
speech (i.e., speech which did not fall into a “lower value” category such as commercial 
114
 308 F.3d 106, 110-111 (1st Cir. 2002).
115 Id. at 116.
116
 43 F.3d 731 (1st Cir. 1995).
117
 18 F.3d 1043, 1061-1066 (4th Cir. 1994).
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speech or obscenity), where there were no special considerations (such as government 
ownership) in play suggesting a greater regulatory role for the government, and yet the 
standard of review applied was no different from, and thus no more protective of, the 
standard developed by the Supreme Court in the context of the assorted special 
circumstances discussed above. As Rappa demonstrates, and for reasons discussed in 
more detail below,118 these cases involve a significant and potentially troubling expansion 
of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with important implications for what one would 
surely consider “core” First Amendment-protected speech.119
The lesson to be learned from all of this is that development of intermediate 
scrutiny matters, and is having a profound, systematic impact on the law of free speech.  
To fully understand the nature of that impact, however, it is necessary to conduct a more 
systematic examination of the Court of Appeals cases, to see what “intermediate First 
Amendment scrutiny” means in practice.  We now turn to that examination.
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
In order to assemble a comprehensive list of Court of Appeals cases applying 
intermediate scrutiny to free speech claims, I conducted three different searches on the 
LEXIS/NEXIS “US Court of Appeals Cases, Combined” database.  The searches were:  
1.  “First Amendment” and “intermediate scrutiny”; 2.  “intermediate First Amendment 
scrutiny”; and 3.  “intermediate level of scrutiny” and “First Amendment.”  The searches 
118 See nn. __ to __, infra, and accompanying text.
119 Cf. Transunion Corp. v. FCC, 267 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (opinion on Petition for Rehearing) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a congressional ban on the sale of “target marketing lists” by credit 
reporting agencies, on the grounds that the covered speech, because it involved “matters of purely private 
concern,” was “low-value” speech and so not entitled to strict scrutiny).  Transunion is distinguishable 
from the cases discussed in the text because it does not involve “fully protected” speech; but it is another 
instance of the steady expansion of intermediate scrutiny.
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were conducted for all cases through calendar year 2005, and were last updated on 
January 20, 2006.  It is obvious that the resulting list of cases will not include all opinions 
falling within the various categories listed in the previous section, since an opinion 
resolving, for example, a challenge to a commercial speech regulation may not use the 
phrase “intermediate scrutiny” (or some variant).  But the above searches are likely to 
identify almost all cases where the court was self-consciously applying the intermediate 
standard of review to a free speech claim.  Since the purpose of this paper is to explore 
the operation of this new standard in the appellate courts, that seemed the relevant 
criterion.
After the lists of cases produced had been culled for false positives and duplicates 
(including multiple appeals in the same case), 111 cases remained.120  The earliest of 
these cases dates from 1983, and the latest from December of 2005, demonstrating that 
the intermediate scrutiny test now has a well-established pedigree.  The cases, however, 
also demonstrate that the test has gained substantially greater acceptance in recent years.  
Of the 111 cases found, only 4 dated from the 1980s, and 47 from the 1990s.  A full 60 of 
the cases, over half, date from the six years from 2000 through 2005; and indeed, of the 
47 cases decided in the 1990s, only 8 were decided before 1995.  Thus of the 111
relevant cases, a full 99, or 89.2%, date from the 11 years from 1995 through 2005.  What 
exactly the trigger for this explosion was is hard to say (perhaps the Supreme Court’s 
Turner Broadcasting decision in 1994121), but that an explosion has occurred over the 
past decade, creating a new category of jurisprudence, cannot seriously be doubted given
these figures.  It is now turn to examine how these cases break down, and what they do.
120
 The list of resulting cases, along with citations and classifications, is [available on website/reprinted 
as Appendix].
121
 See supra at n. __, and accompanying text).
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The Pattern of the Cases
The cases compiled were divided into the eight categories representing the 
various areas of Supreme Court caselaw from which intermediate scrutiny evolved, along 
with a ninth category of cases involving challenges to content-neutral regulations of fully 
valued private speech, on private property.122  The cases were further classified based on 
whether the government action was upheld, or the free speech claim was sustained.  Each 
of these classification decisions, of course, required judgment calls, sometimes difficult 
ones.  For example, many of the cases might have been placed into either of two (or even 
more) categories, and the deciding courts sometimes wavered on their proper 
classification – indeed, it is one of the theses of this paper that in recent years, the distinct 
categories of intermediate scrutiny analysis have been blended in the lower courts.  I 
nevertheless placed each case within a single category, the one which seemed the best fit.  
Furthermore, some of the cases resulted in remands, rather than clear conclusions 
regarding constitutionality; in those circumstances, I classified the case based on my 
assessment of whether the terms of the opinion seemed to view the law as likely valid, or 
likely invalid (for example, if the appellate opinion was reversing a clear result below 
regarding constitutionality, I tended to classify the case as opposite to the result reached 
below).  Obviously, another analyst might have made different judgments regarding 
individual cases; but these minor differences are very unlikely to alter the overall picture.
What then is that picture – what do the numbers reveal?  The results of my 
classifications are set forth in the Table that follows:
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 For a discussion of how the Courts of Appeals have extended intermediate scrutiny to this kind of case, 
see supra, nn. __ to __ and accompanying text.
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Category (Regulations of . . .) Government 
Action Upheld
Free Speech 
Claim Sustained
TOTAL
Time, Place and Manner of 
Speech on Public Property
11 2 13
Symbolic Conduct 11 2 13
The Mass Media 8 4 12
Commercial Speech 8 5 13
Speech of Government Employees 2 2 4
Sexually Oriented Businesses 22 12 34
Charitable Solicitation 3 0 3
Political Contributions 2 0 2
Protected Private Speech on 
Private Property (Content-
Neutral only)
14 3 17
TOTALS 81 30 111
Some clear patterns emerge from this Table.  First, the cases were spread 
relatively evenly across the nine selected categories; though one category – regulations of 
sexually oriented businesses – included substantially more cases (indeed, twice as many) 
as any other category, reflecting a depressing recent trend across free speech law.  
Second, the government tends to win – the constitutionality of the government action was 
sustained in 81 of the 111 cases, with only 30 free speech victories (i.e., the government 
wins 73%, or almost three-quarters, of the time).  Third, the outcomes were fairly even 
across the categories -- in other words, the government’s advantage is not limited to those 
areas, such as regulations of sexually oriented businesses, where the Supreme Court has 
in recent years signaled a preference for constitutionality.  Finally (following from the 
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above), there are a substantial number of cases within the ninth category of private 
speech on private property, into which the lower courts have extended the intermediate 
scrutiny test despite the lack of either weak speech rights or an especially strong 
regulatory interest,; and in this category, the government’s advantage is if anything even 
stronger (with a 82.4% win ratio) than in the general run of intermediate scrutiny cases.
The patterns described above, simple though they are, have important 
implications for the shape and efficacy of the law in this area.  Before turning to those 
implications, however, there is value in examining the reasoning and results in a 
sampling of the most interesting cases from those compiled.  Such an examination reveals 
distinct, though complementary, patterns and lessons from a numerical approach.
A Sampling of the Cases
Time, Place and Manner Case(s): 
Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston:123  The First Circuit upheld restrictions 
placed by the City of Boston on demonstrators during the 2004 Democratic Party 
Convention in Boston, the effect of which was to limit demonstrators to a “demonstration 
zone” which was separated from the convention space itself and surrounded by fencing 
and some coiled razor wire.  As the court described them, “the aggregate effect of the 
security measures was to create an enclosed space that the [demonstrator plaintiff] likens 
to a pen.”  Noting that “the government’s judgment as to the best means for achieving its 
legitimate objectives deserves considerable respect,” the court concluded that because of 
the potentially serious security threats facing the Convention, the restrictions constituted 
a reasonable balance between free speech and regulatory interests.  The court 
123
 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
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acknowledged that this was a difficult case, given the fact that the restrictions here were 
significant and the regulated speech was of extremely high (indeed, arguably the highest) 
First Amendment value, but nonetheless found intermediate scrutiny satisfied.
Symbolic Conduct Case(s): 
Hodkins v. Peterson:124  The Seventh Circuit, invoking the O’Brien and Ward
tests, struck down an Indiana curfew law excluding (with certain exceptions) minors 
between fifteen and seventeen years old from public places during late night hours.  The 
court concluded that the law was not “narrowly tailored” because it lacked adequate 
exceptions for minors who were engaged in First Amendment activities, even though the 
court had earlier acknowledged that the law was not directed at, and did not have a 
disproportionate impact on, free speech.
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno:125  The Ninth Circuit, by Judge Kozinski, 
upheld a criminal statute prohibiting the provision of “material aid” to terrorist 
organizations against a claim that the statute burdened speech and association rights 
because of the expressive nature of providing financial support to organizations which 
engaged in political advocacy (which, according to the plaintiffs, terrorist organizations 
do).  The court applied intermediate scrutiny, citing O’Brien, but then found the standard 
easily satisfied.
Mass Media Case(s): 
Time-Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC:126  The D.C. Circuit struck down 
regulations enacted by the Federal Communications Commission which imposed 
horizontal and vertical limits on ownership in the cable television industry.  The rules 
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 355 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2004).
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 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
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 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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prohibited any single cable company from reaching more than 30% of the total number of 
U.S. subscribers to multichannel video programming services (i.e., cable television and 
direct broadcast satellite services), and prohibited cable firms from dedicating over 40% 
of their channels to programming in which they had a financial interest.  The court 
applied intermediate scrutiny because the rules were content-neutral, but then struck 
down the regulations on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to establish that 
the rules were necessary (i.e., narrowly tailored) to achieve the Commission’s objectives. 
This case was of some importance, because it represented an important setback to 
congressional efforts to regulate the cable industry.
Time-Warner Entertainment v. FCC:127  The D.C. Circuit upheld legislation and 
implementing regulations restricting the rates charged by cable television companies.  
Citing Turner, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, and then found the test easily 
satisfied.
Commercial Speech Case(s): 
Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke:128 The Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny 
and upheld a Baltimore ordinance imposing broad restrictions on outdoor, billboard 
advertising of alcoholic beverages, on the grounds that the ban constituted a reasonable 
means of combating underage drinking.  While acknowledging that the fourth, narrow
tailoring prong of the Central Hudson test constituted “the closest question in this case,” 
the court nonetheless concluded that the tailoring requirement was satisfied given the 
other avenues that remained available for such advertising to reach adult audiences.
Speech of Government Employees Case(s):
127
 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Thomasson v. Perry:129  The Fourth Circuit upheld against a (among others) First 
Amendment challenge the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy towards 
homosexuals.  The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny applied both because the 
policy was content-neutral, and because it involved the speech of government employees, 
and then ruled for the government on the grounds that the policy was “an allowable 
means of furthering the nation’s military mission.”
Sexually Oriented Businesses Case(s): 
 R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford:130  The Seventh Circuit applied intermediate 
scrutiny to, but then struck down, a zoning ordinance restricting the location of 
establishments featuring (clothed) “exotic dancing,” and in particular forcing such 
establishments to locate more than 1000 feet away from schools, churches, residential 
districts, or other such clubs.  The court concluded that the City had failed to demonstrate 
that its ordinance would in fact reduce the “secondary effects” associated with such clubs, 
and that in any event the ordinance was not narrowly tailored because it might sweep in 
some “mainstream performances.”  In so holding, the court appeared to impose a fairly 
substantial evidentiary burden on municipalities seeking to adopt such ordinances.
Charitable Solicitation Case(s): 
 National Federation of the Blind v. FTC: 131  The Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by 
Judge Wilkinson, upheld a series of regulations issued by the Federal Trade Commission 
restricting telephone fundraising by professional fundraisers on behalf of charitable 
organizations.  The regulations did not ban such fundraising, but limited it in various 
ways, including limiting the fundraising to daytime hours, imposing disclosure 
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requirements, and requiring fundraisers to respect a request that no further calls be made.  
The regulations did not, however, restrict fundraising by nonprofit charities on their own 
behalf.  While acknowledging that the speech regulated here was fully protected, and of 
high First Amendment value, the court concluded that the regulations were properly 
tailored to advance the government’s interests in preventing fraud, and securing privacy 
in the home.
Political Contribution Case(s): 
 Michigan State v. Miller:132  The Sixth Circuit upheld a statute requiring annual 
consent to political contributions collected from union members through automatic 
payroll deductions.  The court concluded (counter-intuitively) that the law was content-
neutral, despite being limited to political contributions, on the grounds that the purpose
of the law was not related to content, and then upheld the law under intermediate scrutiny 
as a reasonable means to ensure that political contributions indeed respect the wishes of 
union members.  As with the Bl(a)ck Tea Society case discussed above (and the Rappa
case discussed below), the court here upheld restrictions directed at core First 
Amendment values (assuming, as should be uncontroversial, that political speech is the 
most highly valued under the First Amendment) by avoiding strict scrutiny, and then 
applying a relatively deferential form of intermediate scrutiny.  Of course, Miller might 
be distinguished from those other cases on the grounds that the net effect of the Michigan 
statute is to advance rather than burden speech rights (to wit, the right of individual 
employees to control their political contributions), and so the result is probably entirely 
defensible. But the doctrinal path the court chose to its conclusion was to apply reduced 
scrutiny rather than to find no free speech burden at all.
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Republican Nat’l Committee v. Federal Election Commission:133  The D.C. 
Circuit upheld against First Amendment challenge an FEC regulation (implementing a 
congressional statute) which requires that political committees must make “best efforts” 
to obtain and submit to the FEC information regarding the identity and other details 
regarding donors who contribute more than $200, by sending follow-up requests to 
donors who do not originally provide the information.  The court held that the additional 
financial burden of sending such requests was not sufficient to significantly burden the 
speech of political committees. 
Private Speech Case(s): 
Casey v. City of Newport:134 The First Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to, but 
then struck down, licensing restrictions on a nightclub which prohibited all amplification 
and (oddly) all singing.  The court concluded that though both restrictions, even the ban 
on singing, were content neutral because their purpose was to limit disturbance to 
residential neighbors, neither restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.  As 
noted previously,135 this case is a prime example of the extension of intermediate scrutiny 
to a situation where the regulated speech is fully protected, and there are no special 
circumstances (such as government ownership) elevating the state’s regulatory interests.
Universal Cities Studios, Inc. v. Corly:136  The Second Circuit upheld provisions 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act prohibiting “trafficking” in technology used in 
circumventing encryption or other “digital walls” used to protect copyrighted works, as 
applied to the posting on a website of computer code usable to decrypt DVDs’ digital 
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protections.  The court held that the provisions were content-neutral because they 
targeted the functional, rather than the communicative, aspects of the code, and then 
applying intermediate scrutiny found the legislation properly tailored.  Again, this case 
involved application of intermediate scrutiny to purely private speech, albeit in this case 
the speech had a “conduct” element to it, given the intertwined communicative and 
functional aspects of computer code.
Transunion Corp. v. FTC:137  The D.C. Circuit upheld a regulation banning the 
sale of “target marketing lists” by credit reporting agencies.  The court concluded that 
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate, even though the regulation was arguably content-
based, because the regulated speech was of “purely private concern” and so merited 
reduced First Amendment protection.  The court then found the regulation easily passed 
intermediate scrutiny.  This too was a case involving purely private speech, and the court 
pushed precedent quite far (relying, for example, on libel cases involving false speech) to 
invoke intermediate scrutiny.
National Amusements v. Town of Dedham:138  The First Circuit upheld a 
municipal law barring movie theaters from showing movies between 1 and 6 a.m.  The 
regulation was (obviously) content-neutral, and was found to be a reasonable effort to 
control the noise and disruption caused by late night crowds.  Note that this too is an 
example of intermediate scrutiny being applied to purely private, fully protected speech, 
on purely private property.
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Rappa v. New Castle County:139  The Third Circuit considered, and largely 
upheld, various Delaware statutes barring many but not all highway signs on or adjacent 
to state highways, including signs on private property adjacent to highway right-of-ways.  
The statutes were challenged by a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, who 
wished to post campaign signs which violated the statutes.  The court applied 
intermediate scrutiny despite the fact that the laws clearly distinguished between 
permissible and impermissible signs based on their content (e.g., permitting “for sale” 
and directional signs), because the purpose of those exemptions was not to suppress 
speech, but rather was related to the function of the relevant property.  It then concluded 
that the statutory schemes were largely permissible under this approach, though it struck 
down aspects of the challenged statutes on the grounds that some of the exemptions were 
not justifiable under the court’s analysis.  As discussed above, the obvious impact of this 
case was to place substantial barriers in the way of political candidates, such as the 
plaintiff in this case, who seek to use signage to obtain the name recognition necessary to 
challenge political incumbents.  As such, the ruling has a significant, and arguably 
perverse, impact on political speech and the political process.
IMPLICATIONS
As the numerical analyses and summaries provided above indicate, close 
examination of free speech intermediate scrutiny cases in the Courts of Appeals reveals 
some extraordinary patterns and results.  Moving now from the descriptive to the 
prescriptive, it is time to consider what overarching conclusions may be drawn here, and 
what implications this has for the future.  As I will argue, there are in fact important 
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lessons to be gleaned from the above, relating both to the role of doctrine in a hierarchical 
judicial system, and to its capacity to produce predictable and desirable results.  I 
conclude with some thoughts about where the Supreme Court might go from here, to 
avoid or alleviate the problems that this paper has exposed.
The Supreme Court and the Problem of Coherence
The first and most significant lesson that emerges from the above analysis is that a 
very large disjunction has arisen in recent years between the Supreme Court’s apparent
preferences and policies and what the Courts of Appeals are actually doing.  The doctrine 
that the Supreme Court has created in this area of First Amendment law has simply failed 
as a mechanism for control over lower court decisionmaking.  In other words, the lower 
courts are not following the Supreme Court’s marching orders.
What is the basis for this conclusion?  Consider the various strands of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions.  As my description in the first part of this paper 
demonstrates, even a cursory examination of the cases within those strands leaves no 
doubt that in the Court’s eyes, all free speech claims within the general rubric of 
“intermediate scrutiny” are not equal.  In certain areas, the Court has been extremely
speech-protective, consistently upholding claims against even quite powerful 
governmental regulatory interests.  For example, in the commercial speech area the Court 
has in recent years been highly receptive to attacks on regulations, striking down 
limitations on tobacco advertising, drug advertising, and liquor labeling.140  Similarly, the 
Court has also consistently struck down restrictions on charitable solicitations, 
emphasizing along the way the highly protected status of such speech.  Finally, while the 
140 See supra at nn. __-__ and accompanying text.
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Court has not taken a consistent stance in the area of regulations of political 
contributions, there can be no doubt that since Buckley v. Valeo141 the Court has strongly 
signaled that such speech is entitled to substantial constitutional protection, and in recent 
years a number of Justices (albeit often in dissent) have argued that such speech should 
be entitled to full First Amendment protection.142
In contrast, in other areas the Court has been much more, indeed resoundingly, 
unreceptive to constitutional claims.  Most notably, in the area of regulating sexually 
oriented businesses the Court, since the 1986 Renton decision143 and through the 2002 
Alameda Books case,144 has been extraordinarily consistent in rejecting constitutional 
claims, going so far as to describe the speech in the nude dancing context as “within the 
outer perimeters of the First Amendment, [but] only marginally so.”145  Similarly, in the 
symbolic conduct area the Court has since the 1968 O’Brien  decision146 rejected 
challenges to content-neutral statutes with absolute consistency; indeed, so much so that 
Justice Scalia, noting this pattern, has urged the Court to abandon any heightened 
scrutiny of such regulations at all.147  Indeed, the pattern of cases is so clear in these two 
areas of law that there is a strong case to be made that the Court has in fact adopted a 
categorical balancing approach in these two areas, and resolved the balance against 
speech claims.  The problem is, of course, that if this is the Court’s conclusion it has not 
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146 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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made it explicit, but rather has subsumed these areas of law into general “intermediate 
scrutiny” analysis, thereby sending very mixed signals to the lower courts.
The pattern of the Supreme Court decisions in this area is thus relatively clear.  
Moreover, the pattern makes good sense, as a matter of constitutional policy.  Close 
judicial scrutiny of the application of content-neutral regulations to symbolic conduct 
raises profound problems of manageability and interferes with legitimate legislative 
policy, since essentially any conduct can be employed to “communicate a message” 
(consider the September 11 attacks).  And no serious theory of the First Amendment 
would place regulations of sexually oriented businesses at anything but the outer 
periphery of free speech policy.  Charitable solicitations, however, are an essential 
component of the activities of nonprofit organizations, which are in turn heavily involved 
in political and policy advocacy in this country.  Similarly, regulations of the political 
process raise profound concerns about legislative interference with democracy, and so 
with the “self-governance” rationale of the First Amendment.148  And finally, while 
strong protection for commercial speech might be more controversial, it seems clear that 
in recent years a number of Justices have begun to question the proposition that 
commercial speech has systematically “lower value” than other speech protected by the 
First Amendment.149
An examination of the cases, however, suggests that the Courts of Appeals have 
largely failed to pick up on these cues, or these ideas.  As noted above, the lower courts’ 
analysis of cases in different areas of “intermediate scrutiny” is very consistent –
regardless of context, the government usually wins.  Indeed, insofar as there are
148 See generally A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948).
149 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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differences in outcomes, they seem to fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s guidance.  
As noted earlier, overall free speech claims were upheld by the Courts of Appeals in 30
out of a total of 111 cases, or 27% of the time.  In the highly protected areas of charitable 
solicitations and political contributions, however, none of the First Amendment claims 
were upheld (albeit out of a small sample of five cases).  In contrast, a surprising 35.3% 
(12 out of 34) of the challenges to regulations of sexually oriented businesses succeeded, 
despite the lack of any success for such claims in the Supreme Court.  In the symbolic 
conduct area the lower courts were more hostile, accepting only 15.4% (2 out of 13) 
claims, though even that might be generous given the Supreme Court’s posture; and in 
any event, the numerical breakdown in the symbolic speech cases is identical to that in 
the time, place, and manner cases, where the Supreme Court itself has been far less 
hostile to speech claims.150  It is only in the commercial speech area that there is some
significant evidence that the Court’s cues are being read – the lower courts have accepted 
5 out of 13, or 38.5% of claims, which is obviously substantially higher than the average 
overall.  Even here, however, some doubts arise.  A 38.5% win ratio (barely higher than 1 
out of 3) seems rather low, given the trend of cases in the Supreme Court, the seeming, 
gradual merger of commercial speech doctrine with the doctrine governing fully-
protected speech, and the fact that commercial speech regulations are essentially always
content-based.
What explains the gap between the Supreme Court’s decisions and lower court 
applications of those decisions?  One possible answer is deliberate defiance – lower court 
judges simply do not share the assessments of the Justices regarding the relative weights 
of speech and regulatory interests, and so are reaching different conclusions.  But this 
150 See supra nn. __-__ and accompanying text.
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does not seem a terribly plausible story.  It seems exceedingly unlikely, for example, that 
a large number of federal appellate judges think that pornographic theaters and nude 
dancing constitute more valuable speech than charitable solicitation or political 
contributions.  And in any event, the opinions themselves do not suggest any consistent 
pattern of criticism of the Court’s decisions, making a pattern of such consistent 
divergence unlikely to be a product of conscious disregard.
Another possible explanation for the discrepancies between Supreme Court and 
appellate outcomes is case selection – i.e., that in the categories where government win 
rates are high, plaintiffs tend to bring weaker claims.  This explanation (though harder to 
refute without a more detailed, and inevitably subjective, examination of all of the cases 
in my sample) also seems inadequate.  In particular, with respect to regulations of 
sexually oriented businesses, given the obvious, strong economic incentives of plaintiffs 
in those cases to challenge regulations even when the claim on the merits is relatively 
weak, one would expect a lower win ratio than in other areas of intermediate scrutiny; yet 
the result is the opposite.  And while economic incentives to bring weak claims 
(combined, presumably, with a bias in the certiorari process for the Supreme Court to 
hear relatively strong claims) might explain the lack of plaintiff success in political 
contribution and charitable solicitation cases, that bias seems hardly sufficient to explain 
a 0% success rate.  Finally, an examination of individual appellate case in areas where the 
Supreme Court has accorded strong protection, such as commercial speech151 and 
151 See, e.g., Capobianco v. Summers, 377 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding 30 day bar on soliciting of 
accident victims by chiropractors); Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (rejecting First Amendment 
challenges to extensive regulation of tobacco advertising; First Amendment analysis largely rejected by 
Supreme Court on certiorari); Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding ban on 
billboard advertising of alcohol).
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charitable solicitation,152 strongly suggests that in a number of them, appellate courts 
rejected constitutional challenges which the Court would have sustained.  Thus case 
selection also seems a poor, or at least insufficient, explanation for why results in 
appellate intermediate scrutiny cases diverge so sharply from those in the Supreme Court.
Rather, the problem here seems to stem from the very shape, the structure, of the 
Court’s doctrine in this area.  As noted above, the common characteristic of all of the 
various intermediate scrutiny “tests” announced by the Supreme Court is a requirement 
that a reviewing court examine both the strength of the (important/substantial/significant) 
governmental interest asserted in support of the regulation, and the level of “tailoring” of 
the regulation (including, notably the availability of alternate channels of 
communication).  In fact, however, as Geoffrey Stone noted almost twenty years ago, all 
of these tests clearly constitute an implicit form of balancing (albeit some of them might 
constitute categorical, rather than case-by- case balancing).153  A number of Court of 
Appeals decisions recognize that intermediate scrutiny constitutes a form of balancing,154
and of course the Pickering test for restrictions on the speech of government employees 
has always been described as “Pickering balancing.”155  Moreover, balancing follows 
naturally from the very vacuity of the intermediate scrutiny formulations.  The tests, or 
test, require courts to assess whether a government interest is “important” or “substantial” 
152 See, e.g., FOP v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding ban on professional solicitors 
acting on behalf of charities calling telephone numbers on state “do not call” registry); National Federation 
of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding broad regulation of telemarketing on behalf of 
charitable foundations); American Target Advertising v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding 
statute imposing licensing and other obligations on “professional fundraising consultants,” though striking 
down a few provisions of statute).
153
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154 See, e.g., Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 2005); Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 
378 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., concurring); Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee 
County, 337 F.3d 1251, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003); Casey v. City of Newport, 308 F.3d 106, 110-111 (1st Cir. 
2002); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 123 (3 rd Cir. 1999), aff’d 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
155 See supra at __.
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or “significant,” but that inquiry obviously cannot be made in a vacuum, especially given 
the malleability of the intermediate scrutiny formulations (what exactly is an “important” 
or “significant” policy?), and given the institutional limitations on the ability of courts to 
make such policy judgments regarding the abstract strength of a social policy.156  Instead, 
the tests inevitably invite courts to compare – i.e., to balance – the strength of the 
asserted policy against the constitutional interests on the other side.  Tailoring analysis 
factors into this balancing because it informs one’s judgments regarding the extent and 
necessity of the burden on speech interests.  The difficulty is that such a balancing 
approach, with no further elucidation (and the Supreme Court, at least in enunciating 
doctrine has given none), provides little or no guidance about how to balance.  In 
particular, it does not clarify what kinds of speech rights should be highly valued (or 
concomitantly, what kinds should not), and what kinds of regulatory interests, in what 
contexts, should be given more or less weight.  Indeed, the falling back onto vaguely 
articulated balancing tests seems almost an admission of the Supreme Court’s inability to 
articulate such standards.  But the inevitable result of that inability is, of course, 
unpredictability and inconsistency.
Another way to describe the jurisprudential difficulty in this area is that the 
Courts of Appeals have demonstrated a systematic inability to calibrate their 
constitutional analysis to the relative strengths of the speech and regulatory interests in 
individual cases.  The sharp disjunctions described above between the Supreme Court’s 
decisions and the results in the lower courts, especially in the areas of charitable speech, 
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political contributions, and time, place, and manner restrictions, are indicative of this 
phenomenon, since they seem to evince an inability to grapple with the fact that the 
speech in such cases matters, and should be given at least a presumption of protection, 
albeit not an absolute one.  Even more salient are the outcomes in cases involving 
content-neutral regulations of the mass media, as well as of private, fully protected 
speech on private property (the area into which the lower courts have extended the 
intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence).  These are all cases in which the regulated speech is 
fully protected, and therefore presumptively of high value (especially, of course, in the 
context of mass media regulation).  At the same time, there are not cases where the State 
has special interests, either as a proprietor (as is true in the time, place, and manner/public 
forum and government employee cases) or as a regulator (as is true in the symbolic 
conduct cases).  And yet, in the Courts of Appeals there is simply no significant 
difference between these and other intermediate scrutiny cases.  In the mass media 
category, the success rate of First Amendment claims is 33.3% (4 out of 12), only 
marginally higher than the overall 27% rate; and in the private speech cases, the success 
rate is only 17.6% (3 out of 17), lower than the overall rate, and lower than the success 
rate in commercial speech (38.5%) and sexually oriented businesses (35.3%) categories.  
These results simply make no social sense.
In addition to being unprincipled and unpredictable, that fact that intermediate 
scrutiny has over time collapsed into undifferentiated balancing also probably explains 
the substantial advantage enjoyed by the government in these cases.  The difficulty is 
this:  in any intermediate scrutiny case, a reviewing court is being asked to compare a 
burden on speech against a claimed regulatory objective.  By definition, however, in any 
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individual intermediate scrutiny case, the speech interest is going to be relatively 
marginal, either because the regulation does not target communicative impact, because it 
is targeted at “low value” speech, or perhaps both (both factors would seem to be in play 
in the symbolic conduct cases, for example).  This is true by definition because if the 
speech interests were not reduced, the court would be applying strict, not intermediate 
scrutiny.  On the other hand, the regulatory interests in intermediate scrutiny cases are no 
less weighty than in strict scrutiny cases.  Indeed, they are often weightier, because 
intermediate scrutiny is often applied in contexts such as commercial speech, regulation 
of conduct, or regulation of publicly owned property, where the government’s regulatory 
interests are particularly powerful.  The result is a systematic bias in judicial perceptions 
and decisions in favor of the government, resulting in a rejection of First Amendment 
claims in almost three-quarters of cases.157
But, one might argue, isn’t that entirely appropriate given the relative weights of 
the constitutional and regulatory interests here?  Perhaps so in any individual case, since 
in no individual case does the loss of free speech seem all that significant.  Furthermore, 
absent a theoretically grounded base rate, there is no way to know whether the actual win 
rate for the government one sees in the cases (73%) is “too high” or “too low.”  I do not 
claim to possess any theory for derive such a base rate, and indeed doubt that such a base 
rate can be meaningfully defined with the decision rule is as amorphous as case-by- case 
balancing.  The problem is that the cumulative effects of a large number of decisions, all 
prone to the same pro-government bias, leads to the suppression of a great deal of speech 
indeed, so much so as to potentially skew the shape of political and cultural debate.  
Consider, for example, the cumulative effect of cases such as Bl(a)ck Tea Society and 
157
 For a similar argument, see Stone, supra, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 79.
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Rappa,158 upholding very intrusive restrictions on the time and place of core, political 
speech.  Such restrictions are far more likely to burden political insurgents or “the poorly 
financed causes of little people,”159 than political incumbents or socially powerful 
interests, resulting in an entrenchment of governing interests and ideas -- the very 
opposite of the purposes of the First Amendment.  Similarly, the consistent validation of 
restrictions on charitable solicitations threatens to hamstring nongovernmental 
organizations, which provide an important source of social dissent.  And the (fairly) 
consistent sustaining of structural regulations of the mass media also gives the state a tool 
to exert pressures on, and extract favors from, the institutional media, thereby restricting 
yet another source of dissent or oversight.  None of this is to say that Armageddon is 
upon us, or that our democracy is on the verge of collapse; but it is to say that the 
intermediate scrutiny cases do contribute to the general weakening of “debate on public 
issues [that is] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”160
It must be understood that the above arguments should not necessarily be 
considered a wholesale condemnation of balancing methodology (though such 
condemnations might be appropriate, and certainly have been offered elsewhere).161
There is nothing about balancing as a methodology that necessarily precludes judges 
from carefully considering the relative strengths, in each individual case, of speech and 
regulatory interests.  The difficulty is that the intermediate scrutiny doctrine, as 
articulated by the Supreme Court, does not provide any guidance on how such 
158 See supra at __.
159 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (Black, J.); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77, 102-104 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
160 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
161 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943 (1987).  
For a  summary of the commentary, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of 
Constitutional Doctrine, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 961, 989-1001 (1998).
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assessments should be made, thereby eliminating any hope that the Court can assert 
control over (and consistency among) appellate courts applying its precedents.  And 
furthermore, the pattern of appellate results and their variation from the Supreme Court’s 
articulated preferences suggest that in practice the lower courts, in applying intermediate 
scrutiny, have failed to take into account in any systematic way such obviously relevant 
factors as the value of the different kinds speech, and whether there exists any special 
need for regulation in different spheres of life and activity.  The question that obviously 
remains is whether there exist strategies by which doctrine might be reformed to advance 
the complementary goals of control, consistency, and principle in this area of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.
A Call for Disaggregation
The fundamental irrationalities and inconsistencies that one observes in the 
“intermediate scrutiny” free speech caselaw in the Courts of Appeals appear to be a 
direct, and rather predictable, product of the imprecision and malleability of the doctrine 
announced by the Supreme Court.  This imprecision and malleability appear in turn to be 
direct results of the fact that the “test,” or “tests,” that constitute intermediate scrutiny 
inevitably collapse into unguided balancing.  One might therefore be tempted to conclude 
that the only solution to the problem is to abandon balancing altogether.  Such a radical 
solution, however, is not necessary, and furthermore is probably not even desirable.  
Instead, a better and more achievable goal might be to move towards more focused, and 
targeted, doctrinal tests, albeit tests which still incorporate an element of balancing.
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Taking the desirability point first, it is not at all clear that balancing can or should 
be eliminated altogether from the various areas of law that constitute intermediate 
scrutiny.  As Geoffrey Stone has argued, reduced scrutiny of content-neutral regulations, 
and some element of balancing (whether categorical or case-by- case), may be 
unavoidable in resolving these cases.   The reason is simple.  As noted above,162
intermediate scrutiny cases are by definition cases where the Court has concluded that 
strict scrutiny should not apply, because of some combination of the lower value of 
protected speech (as in the commercial and sexual speech cases), the strong societal 
interests at stake (as in the public property, symbolic conduct, government employee and 
political contribution cases), or simply because of lessened concerns about governmental 
misconduct (as in the mass media and pure content-neutral cases).163  Nonetheless, 
because of the highly preferred status of free speech in our constitutional ideology, the 
Court also does not believe that the utterly supine rational basis standard is appropriate in 
these cases.  Thus in every intermediate scrutiny case some difficult reconciliation of 
speech and regulatory interests will be necessary.  And that need would seem to lead 
logically to balancing – even if with respect to some kinds of speech or regulations, the 
result of balancing is to conclude (as in the child pornography context)164 that 
constitutional claims should be rejected on a categorical basis.
Balancing thus may be inevitable here.  But it need not be unguided, unfettered 
balancing.  The lack of guidance, indeed the chaos, in this area is not a result of balancing 
as such, it is a result of the vague and open-ended nature of the tests the Court has 
fashioned here -- the ultimate in doctrinal mush.  That mush is an inevitable consequence 
162 Supra at __.
163
 Stone, supra, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 74-76; see also Bhagwat, supra, 30 Conn. L. Rev. at 1000.
164 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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of trying to deal with the extraordinarily varied issues and problems which arise in the 
various areas of doctrine that have been subsumed into intermediate scrutiny through one 
overarching “test.”  But that step, the creation of a single, indivisible middle tier in free 
speech law, was neither necessary nor desirable, and it should be reversed.
In short, the solution here is disaggregation, the dismantling of the intermediate 
scrutiny test into its constituent parts.  The primary benefit of such disaggregation is that 
it will permit the development of a more detailed jurisprudence (or more accurately, 
multiple bodies of jurisprudence) regarding how courts should balance speech and 
societal interests in different areas of free speech law.  In particular, such a jurisprudence 
could begin to articulate standards regarding what kinds of speech, and what kinds of 
regulatory interests, should be accorded more or less weight (or indeed, any weight at all) 
in each of the different areas of law which have been combined into intermediate 
scrutiny– including in some instances, perhaps, a categorical conclusion that certain kinds 
of free speech claims should always be rejected.165  Such bodies of jurisprudence could 
substantially reduce the disjunction between appellate decisions and the Supreme Court’s 
apparent preferences, as well as the seeming randomness of the results in the lower 
courts.166
To understand fully why disaggregation holds promise for such desirable 
outcomes, some further explanation is necessary.  One key insight here is that that speech 
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 Unsurprisingly, Justice Scalia has advocated abandoning balancing in favor of just such a conclusion in 
two areas of law within the “intermediate scrutiny” rubric:  content-neutral regulations of symbolic 
conduct, and regulations of “the business of pandering sex.”  See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. at 
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 For a sophisticated examination of the broader jurisprudential question of how the Supreme Court can 
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interests are not equally strong across these different areas of law.  It seems obvious that 
media speech, charitable solicitations, and political speech generally, whether it be on 
public property, by government employees, or completely private, has greater 
constitutional value than sexual speech.  The Court should make that an overt element of 
its precedent.  Similarly, the Court should and must explicitly resolve the question of 
whether commercial speech is, or is not, systematically of lower value than the kinds of 
scientific, artistic, and literary speech that receive full First Amendment protection.  Such 
guidance should have a substantial impact on disciplining balancing.
Even more significant than recognition of the varying strength of speech interests 
(which is, after all, implicit in current law), the law in this area would benefit greatly 
from the realization that different state regulatory interests should not be accorded 
equivalent weights when invoked to regulate different kinds of speech.  Consider, for 
example, the governmental proprietary interests in order, management, and bureaucratic 
discipline which so often underlie restrictions on speech on public property, or speech by 
government employees – such interests can and should certainly be accorded great weight 
in those contexts, but not in other areas of free speech law.  Similarly, the kinds of 
interests in preventing harm, combined with manageability concerns, which so often 
justify the application of generally applicable laws to symbolic conduct should be given 
less or even no weight when regulation specifically targets speech such as commercial 
speech, mass media operations, and charitable solicitation.  Or again, the acknowledged 
interests in preventing false or even misleading speech in the commercial speech and 
charitable solicitations contexts should have little or no relevance for regulations of other 
speech (including most especially political speech) or of the mass media.  Concomitantly, 
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if commercial speech is truly of high First Amendment value, perhaps no other regulatory 
interests should be permitted.
Indeed, a careful examination of relevant and irrelevant regulatory interests has 
promise for entirely revolutionizing some areas of intermediate scrutiny law.  In mass 
media cases, for example, there is a powerful argument to the made that the only
permissible state interest should be one in preserving competition and a diversity of 
voices, without preferring any specific speech or speakers.167  Similarly, when speech of 
government employees is at issue, why should any suppression be permitted when the 
relevant speech is not on government property, and does not disclose confidential 
information?  Surely in those circumstances the State’s proprietary interests are only most 
marginally involved, and if that is the case, what reason is there for reduced protection of 
the speech?  Finally, with respect to regulation of sexual speech and sexually oriented 
businesses, the Court might articulate with greater precision what exactly are the relevant 
regulatory interests here.  Is it secondary effects -- and if so, what kinds of secondary 
effects?  Is it protection of children?  If so, protection from what, and what role do 
parental preferences play here?168  Or is it simply because nudity and depictions of 
sexuality are “contra bonos mores,” to quote Justice Scalia?169  Lower courts might like 
to know.
Would such greater specificity in doctrinal formulations make any difference in 
individual cases?  There are of course no guarantees, but it might.  Consider for example 
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the Bl(a)ck Tea Society case, involving demonstrators at the 2004 Democratic National 
Convention,170 the National Federation of the Blind case involving regulation of 
charitable solicitations,171 or the Rappa case concerning roadside signs.172  In each of 
those cases, the appellate court might have reached different results if it had given more 
weight to the fact that the suppressed speech was of very high value.  Concomitantly, in 
the 2001 Time- Warner Entertainment case,173 the D.C. Circuit might have been more 
tolerant of the cable industry regulations it struck down if it had acknowledged the power 
of the governmental interest in maintaining competition and a diversity of voices.  
Another case, this time in the commercial speech arena, where more specificity might 
have made a difference is Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke,174 where the Fourth Circuit 
upheld a flat ban on billboard advertising of alcoholic products in most of the City of 
Baltimore.  Given the later result in Lorillard Tobacco in which the Supreme Court 
struck down a similar regulation of tobacco advertising,175 the result here seems 
inconsistent with the Court’s views; and clearer guidance from the Court might have 
avoided the divergence.  In the cases involving regulation of sexually oriented businesses, 
a forthright statements by the Court that in its view such regulations raise only the most 
attenuated First Amendment concerns, which are easily trumped by concerns about 
public morality, might have altered the result in all such cases where the claimants 
prevailed.  Finally, in the cases where courts are evaluating content-neutral regulations of 
speech on private property, a recognition that neither of the critical factors counseling for 
170 See supra at __.
171 See supra at __.
172 See supra at __.
173 See supra at __.
174
 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995).
175 See supra at __.
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deference in other “intermediate scrutiny” cases – low-value speech or special regulatory 
interests – is present might well lead appellate courts to take a far more skeptical stance 
towards regulation.
The above discussion represents a most preliminary survey of the possibilities for 
doctrinal precision here.  Each of the distinct bodies of law which have in recent years 
become subsumed into “intermediate scrutiny” deserves a careful, independent analysis 
of the relevant constitutional and regulatory policies that are raised therein.  This will 
take time and effort, both in the courts and in the scholarly literature.  But the issues here 
are sufficiently important, and the promise of improvement sufficiently real, that the 
effort is worthwhile.
CONCLUSION
Over the past two to three decades, a new, overarching doctrinal test has emerged 
in the area of free speech jurisprudence:  the test of intermediate scrutiny.  The test was 
born as a result of the consolidation and merger of a number of distinct strands of First 
Amendment doctrine, including notably public forum analysis, symbolic conduct 
analysis, the commercial speech doctrine, and the Pickering balancing test for restrictions 
on government employee speech.  Since the mid-1990s, however, especially in the 
decisions of the Courts of Appeals the intermediate scrutiny test has become, in Justice 
Scalia’s words, a “default standard” applicable to essentially all free speech cases where 
strict scrutiny is not, for some reason, appropriate.  Its importance is thus very substantial.
In this paper, I have examined how First Amendment intermediate scrutiny 
functions in practice in the United States Courts of Appeals.  After examining in some 
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detail the very substantial body of intermediate scrutiny caselaw that has emerged, 
especially over the past two decades, I conclude that the test does not in fact function 
very well.  In particular, when applying intermediate scrutiny the Courts of Appeals 
decide cases in ways that do not seem to conform with the policies expressed by Supreme 
Court decisions, the decisions seem to systematically favor the government, and most 
problematically, the pattern of the decisions as a whole does not seem to demonstrate any 
coherent constitutional or social policy.  In short, the cases show a judiciary which is 
adrift.
The doctrinal solution I propose, which should alleviate at least some of the 
dysfunctions revealed by an analysis of the cases, is disaggregation.  I believe that the 
doctrinal merger that has occurred should be reversed, and instead the Supreme Court, 
and the judiciary generally, should restart the process of building distinct, detailed bodies 
of jurisprudence within the different areas of free speech law currently subsumed in the 
“intermediate scrutiny” rubric.  Such a jurisprudence, or such a body of jurisprudences, 
promise to provide clearer answers to the difficult questions raised in intermediate 
scrutiny cases regarding the relative weights to be accorded speech and general societal 
interests, and therefore to provide better guidance to the lower courts.  This is an 
important task for the simple reason that these cases matter.  They matter because despite 
the seemingly triviality of many of the individual cases, collectively their resolution has a 
substantial impact on the shape and content of public debate in our country.  And after 
all, preserving the vitality of that debate is what the First Amendment is all about.
